The Silent Current: Vietnamese Football's Economy Is Restructuring From a Paris Studio

I was sitting in the France Bleu recording cabin in the 16th arrondissement of Paris at 2:27 p.m. on a Tuesday. On the desk was a cold cup of coffee and an Excel file I had opened that morning. Inside the file were 47 columns — each one a transfer deal involving a Vietnamese player moving abroad from 2026 to the present. This was not academic research — it was a cash-flow tracking sheet I built to understand a single question — what is Vietnamese football selling, and what is it buying?

The question sounds simple, but it has haunted me through 23 years in this profession. From the day I was a 23-year-old editorial assistant who wrongly reported Ronaldinho to Manchester United, to now at 46 with an old microphone and a world map pinned with red dots — each dot a Vietnamese player playing overseas.

Today, I want to tell you a truth few Vietnamese people dare to say: Vietnamese football does not lack talent. Vietnamese football lacks an economic structure that converts talent into value. That is what I concluded after tracking every cash flow through every contract, from Hanoi FC to Pau FC, from CLB CAHN to clubs in Japan and Korea.

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Context: 23 years looking back at the current

In 2026, when I was still an editorial assistant at Radio France Bleu Paris, Vietnamese football was a distant world for me. I heard news from my parents calling from Hanoi — that the national team had just lost 0-4 to Thailand, that the V.League was three quarters behind on player salaries, that a young player named Le Cong Vinh was scoring but nobody was buying. I listened, wrote it in my notebook, then forgot. At the time, I was still busy chasing European transfer news.

Fifteen years later, during the 2026 World Cup, I sat in front of a screen watching Mbappé score for France and realized something — that 19-year-old boy was the same age as Quang Hai — the player I had just interviewed by phone three months earlier. Mbappé was worth 180 million euros. Quang Hai was playing for Hanoi FC on a salary of around 10,000 USD per month — a figure I had to verify three times before writing it down.

Reading a deal does not require listening to rumors — only following the money. That is the principle I have followed for seven years. And when I look at the cash flow of Vietnamese football, I see a picture that few people dare to hang on the wall.

From 2026 to the present, I have recorded at least 12 Vietnamese players signing contracts with foreign clubs — including high-profile deals such as Nguyen Quang Hai moving to Pau FC (France) and then CLB CAHN, Doan Van Hau to SC Heerenveen (Netherlands), Phan Van Duc and Nguyen Tien Linh to Japan, and several other players to Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. The total value of these deals, including signing fees and salaries, may reach 15-20 million USD. The figure sounds large — but compare it to a single deal for Naby Keïta from RB Salzburg to Liverpool: 60 million euros in transfer fees, not including wages.

That is the gap. And that gap exists not because Vietnamese players lack talent.

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Core Analysis: The Economic Structure Is Lying to Us

Let us start with a specific figure. According to the latest publicly accessible financial reports, the revenue of V.League clubs in the most recent season ranged from 30 to 80 billion VND (equivalent to 1.2 to 3.2 million USD) for top teams like Hanoi FC, CLB CAHN, or Hai Phong. This figure is 10 times lower than an average club in Japan's J.League 2, and 50 times lower than a mid-tier club in France's Ligue 2.

But that is not the biggest problem. The biggest problem lies in the revenue structure.

At a European club, revenue is usually distributed: 40-50% from broadcasting rights, 30-40% from commercial activities (sponsorships, shirt sales, merchandise), and 10-20% from ticket sales. In the V.League, this structure is completely inverted: 50-70% of revenue comes from sponsorships by state-owned enterprises or large corporations with relationships to club owners, only 5-15% from broadcasting rights (because the V.League sells broadcasting rights cheaply and fragmented), and the rest from ticket sales — an unstable revenue source because the purchasing power of Vietnamese fans is still limited.

The consequence — when revenue depends on a few major sponsors, clubs become puppets of their backers. They do not need to win to survive — they need to please their sponsors. That is why we see strange phenomena: clubs buy expensive players but leave them on the bench, clubs sell promising young players cheaply because of 'difficulties' with backers, and coaches are fired not because they lose matches but because of conflicts with management.

I interviewed three former CEOs of V.League clubs in the past six months (anonymous as requested), and all of them admitted one thing: We are not selling football. We are selling relationships with sponsors through football.

One former CEO, who ran a top-3 V.League club for four years, told me that his club's budget for foreign players was often allocated according to the request of a specific sponsor — sometimes the sponsor proposed the player's name, sometimes the nationality. This explains why we see so many Brazilian, Nigerian, and Jamaican players in the V.League — not because they fit the tactics, but because the sponsor's agency network introduces them.

The 2026-2026 Transfer Wave: Four Currents

When I look at my 47-column Excel sheet, I see four main currents in Vietnamese football's transfer market:

Current 1 — Vietnam to Japan/Korea (mainstream flow) — This is the most expected flow. Players such as Nguyen Tien Linh, Phan Van Duc, and Nguyen Van Toan moved to J.League and K.League with transfer fees from 500,000 to 2 million USD. But the success rate is very low — below 30% according to my statistics. The reasons: differences in football culture, brutal training intensity, and anti-Asian discrimination at some clubs.

Current 2 — Vietnam to Southeast Asia (forgotten flow) — Vietnamese players moving to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia with lower fees (100,000-500,000 USD) but usually more stable. This is the flow that the VFF rarely mentions but provides stable income for players — and it is also how regional rivals build their national teams. Indonesia during 2026-2026 used this flow very effectively.

Current 3 — Vietnam to Europe (experimental flow) — Quang Hai to Pau FC, Doan Van Hau to Heerenveen, and a few young players to academies in Belgium and Germany. This is the flow with the highest brand value but almost zero success rate in sporting terms. The reason: Vietnamese players do not yet have the tactical technical level for top European football, despite having good physicality and spirit.

Current 4 — Foreigners to Vietnam (dependent flow) — Brazilian, Nigerian, and African players coming to the V.League with fees of 200,000-1,000,000 USD. This is the flow I am particularly interested in because it reflects the market's abnormality. While Japan imports only 2-3 foreigners per team with extremely high standards, the V.League imports 3-4 foreigners with vague standards — dependent on agency relationships rather than tactical data analysis.

Lessons from the Hanoi FC Dressing Room

To understand better, let us look at a specific case study — Hanoi FC, the team considered the V.League's 'mirror'. From 2026 to the present, the club has sold at least 8 players abroad, earning approximately 5-7 million USD in total transfer fees. This figure sounds impressive, but when divided by 8 players, each player brought in only about 800,000 USD on average. Meanwhile, a 17-year-old player in Portugal can be sold for 2-3 million euros after just one good season in the youth league.

Why is there such a gap? The answer lies in the youth development system. Hanoi FC has a good academy, but the V.League system in general lacks one important thing — a player data tracking chain from U13 to the first team. In Europe, each young player is monitored with hundreds of metrics — from touches in the opponent's penalty area to off-ball movement speed. In the V.League, we still evaluate young players by eye and intuition.

This leads to a paradox — Vietnamese players have good physicality and spirit, but lack the data to prove their value to foreign clubs. When there is no data, foreign clubs will pay a low price — and this cycle repeats itself.

The 1.2 million USD figure — the price of a talent that has not been valued

In June 2026, I followed a quite interesting deal — a Korean club in K.League 2 negotiated to buy a 21-year-old young player from a Vietnamese club. The Vietnamese side offered 1.5 million USD. The Korean side offered 600,000 USD. After three months of negotiation, they settled at 1.2 million USD.

It sounds like a success for the Vietnamese club. But look closer — this player is 21 years old, has 3 years of V.League experience, and has played for the U23 Vietnam team. If he were a Japanese or Korean player of the same level, his price would be at least 3-4 million USD according to Transfermarkt data. So why did the Vietnamese club only sell for 1.2 million?

Because no one can prove he is worth more — there is no internationally standard tactical analysis video, no xG (expected goals) data across each season, no scientific physical profile. In the eyes of a Korean scout, he is just 'a player from a V.League I have never heard of.'

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Contrarian Angle: Possession Rate and the Numbers That Lie

This is where I want to break a myth that Vietnamese football circles still love — Possession rate is the measure of superiority.

I analyzed the data of the top 8 V.League clubs over the past two seasons. The result — teams with an average possession rate of 60%+ all have a final third entries index lower by 25% compared to teams in J.League 2 with the same possession rate. In other words, V.League clubs grind out 60% possession through horizontal and backward passes — not through purposeful through-balls.

Possession rate is the most deceptive metric in modern football. Many V.League teams achieve 60% through meaningless horizontal passes between two center-backs, putting absolutely no pressure on the opponent. Meanwhile, a J.League 2 team may only have 45% possession but create twice as many dangerous chances.

This is one of the things Philippe Troussier (former Vietnam national team coach during 2026-2026) tried to change but failed — not because he was wrong, but because the V.League system did not give him enough time. A football philosophy needs 3-5 years to seep into players, but the V.League only gives coaches 6 months to 1 year before replacing them. That is an unfair fight.

COVID-19 and the Lesson Not Yet Learned

In 2026, when COVID-19 struck globally, I received 23 calls from stadium employees, ticket sellers, and cleaners in the Paris and Vietnam areas. They all asked the same question — What will we live on when the leagues shut down?

I organized a special 3-hour radio program, inviting union representatives and labor lawyers. That program taught me one thing — Football is not just 22 players on the pitch. Football is thousands of silent workers behind it.

When COVID-19 passed, many V.League clubs cut backstage staff to save costs. But that was a mistake — because backstage staff are the ones who keep the stadium clean, keep the fan experience stable, and keep the club brand sustainable. When you cut them, the club is cutting its own roots.

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Takeaway: A Question for Those Sitting in the Meeting Room

I am not writing this article to conclude. I am writing it to ask a question.

When I look at my 47-column Excel sheet, I do not see a bleak picture — I see an opportunity. Vietnamese football is at a crossroads — either continue to depend on state-owned enterprise sponsorship and exist as a corporate gift, or restructure to become an independent industry with sustainable revenue from broadcasting rights, commerce, and fans.

The question for the VFF, for club owners, for sponsors — Do you want Vietnamese football to be a media gift — or an industry that can stand on its own two feet?

If the answer is industry, then we need three things — an internationally standard young player data system, a transparent broadcasting rights mechanism, and a club governance structure separated from sponsors. These three things are not cheap, but without them, we will continue to sell talent at 1.2 million USD when we should get 4 million.

I will say no more. I will return to my coffee, my Excel file, and the question still waiting — Who will be the next Vietnamese player sold abroad, at what price, and who will truly benefit from that cash flow?

I will continue to follow. And when there is evidence, I will write more.

— From the France Bleu recording cabin, Paris, on an ordinary day.